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I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court
moved further in the direction of at least limited
constitutionalization of plea bargaining.' A majority on the Court
held that criminal defendants must be given "effective assistance"
by their attorneys as they contemplate whether to waive im-
portant legal rights and enter guilty pleas. Fortunately for the
Court, the defense attorneys in the two cases had almost comically
failed to do their jobs and thus the majority could, as it acknowl-
edged, avoid addressing in any very thorough way the parameters
of effective assistance in the plea bargaining context.2 In spite of
this, the Court struggled with identifying a remedy for defendants
whose attorneys falter, a point made quite effectively by the dis-
senting justices. Given the fluidity of plea negotiations, it was
difficult for the Court to say with any certainty what sentences the
defendants would have received if not for the missteps of their at-
torneys. The Court assigned the task of discerning the remedy to
* Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405,
rllippke@indiana.edu.
1. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
These are not the first cases in which the Court has held that defendants who enter guilty
pleas are entitled to "effective assistance" of counsel. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010). For an illuminating discussion of the earlier case, see Stephanos Bibas, Regu-
lating the Plea Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF.
L. REv. 1117 (2011).
2. See Stephanos Bibas on the role of "prevailing professional norms" in defining "ef-
fective assistance." Bibas, supra note 1, at 1144.
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the lower courts, a solution that, as Justice Scalia caustically not-
ed, would require those courts to engage in considerable guess-
work.' Worse than this, the majority conceded that the lower
courts might determine that no remedy whatsoever is necessary,
though the defendants had not received effective assistance during
their plea negotiations.
If the two cases constitute victories for criminal defendants,
then they are modest ones. Indeed, the dissenting justices may
have won the rhetorical fight if the Court is prepared to do no
more than take such tepid steps toward the regulation of plea bar-
gaining. If plea bargaining persists in its current form-one that
grants prosecutors enormous power to pressure defendants for
guilty pleas-then it does seem that defendants ought to be given
competent advice in deciding what to do in the face of such pres-
sure. But the majority of the Court is strangely silent about the
ways in which plea bargaining is currently structured and prac-
ticed in the United States, a silence made all the more noticeable
by the dissenting justices' taunts that plea bargaining is not in the
Constitution and so not appropriately dealt with by the Court at
all. The impression left is that the majority did not quite know
what to say about the "system of pleas" that it acknowledges has
almost entirely replaced criminal trials.
My aim in this discussion is the bold (some will say audacious)
one of showing how the Court might have argued that plea bar-
gaining, as it currently exists in the United States, is contrary to
well-established and broadly-accepted constitutional values re-
specting the adjudication of criminal charges. By "constitutional
values" I mean ones that any plausible reading of the Constitu-
tion, along with its history of interpretation, establishes as basic
to the operations of the U.S. criminal justice system. Most promi-
nent among these values are the presumption of innocence, the
burden of proof on the government in criminal cases, the high
standard of proof the government must meet to convince fact-
finders of the guilt of criminal defendants, the right to an orderly
and public trial by an impartial tribunal, and the necessity of pro-
tecting those accused of crimes from measures designed to coerce
admissions of guilt from them. Contrary to what Justice Scalia
claims, I contend that plea bargaining is in the Constitution, if
being in it means that salient constitutional values have implica-
tions for how it should be structured and regulated. Current plea
3. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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bargaining practices are contrary to those values. Rather than
tinkering further with what effective assistance requires of de-
fense counsel in plea cases, the Court should take the bold step of
indicating that the existing plea system is constitutionally defec-
tive. Fortunately, the Court could, at the same time, articulate a
set of principles for the reform of plea bargaining. Though such
principles might not entirely dictate the acceptable contours and
limits of plea bargaining, they would point toward ways in which
it should be significantly restrained. In particular, these princi-
ples would tell us to find ways to reduce the discretion prosecutors
have to induce guilty pleas from defendants independently of the
evidence they can adduce to demonstrate their guilt.
The discussion proceeds as follows. In the first section, I identi-
fy the constitutional values that underlie criminal trials. Again,
my aim will be to identify substantive values that have, if not in-
disputable constitutional pedigrees, are well-founded within the
mainstream of constitutional thinking. In the second section, I
show how current forms of plea bargaining are deeply at odds with
those values. Specifically, as it is currently structured, plea bar-
gaining makes the state's evidence against criminal defendants of
marginal significance, permits prosecutors, mostly by themselves,
to determine the cogency and reliability of the evidence against
defendants, and tolerates the use of coercive tactics by prosecutors
to obtain guilty pleas. In the third section, the lessons of the first
two sections are put to use in developing principles for the reform
of plea bargaining. We need not provide full-on criminal trials for
all individuals charged with crimes, or even for many of them.
But we should require states and the federal government to sub-
stantially reform plea practices so that they are aligned with con-
stitutional values. Various challenges to and problems with doing
so are addressed. In the final section, limitations in the reforms I
advocate are discussed. It is conceded that restrained plea bar-
gaining practices will not suffice, all by themselves, to bring such
practices fully in line with important constitutional values.
II. TRIALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Any suggestion that there is a set of widely accepted, substan-
tive constitutional values with respect to the adjudication of crim-
inal charges will be met with considerable skepticism. Those fa-
miliar with the deep and abiding controversies concerning consti-
Summer 2013 711
Duquesne Law Review
tutional interpretation will believe that such a claim is preposter-
ous on its face.4 In particular, there has been long-lasting and di-
visive debate about all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights deal-
ing with criminal procedure. More than this, a stingy reading of
the Constitution suggests that certain widely accepted features of
criminal procedure-the presumption of innocence, the burden of
proof, and the reasonable doubt standard foremost among them-
are nowhere to be found in it.' How, then, can I appeal to a set of
core constitutional values with respect to criminal charge adjudi-
cation and hope to gain many adherents?
For one thing, several of the most significant requirements of
appropriate charge adjudication are widely accepted, even if they
are not specifically inscribed in the words of the Constitution.
Among these requirements are that criminal defendants are enti-
tled to a presumption of innocence, the burden of proof is on the
government in criminal trials, and the government has to meet a
high standard of proof in public trials before impartial fact-finders
should be prepared to convict defendants.' Granted, what any of
these provisions means is open to dispute, especially at the mar-
gins.' But that mere suspicions on the part of government officials
that individuals are guilty of crimes is not sufficient to warrant
their punishment, that it is up to government officials to discover
and produce convincing evidence of their guilt, and that the evi-
dence must be powerfully persuasive of their guilt, are claims un-
likely to be gainsaid by many. Likewise, few will dispute the val-
ue of having some tribunal independent of the government offi-
cials who initially investigate and charge individuals with crimes
evaluate the probative force of the evidence against defendants.
The right to trial by jury has long been understood as a vital safe-
4. Any list of significant texts on constitutional interpretation will appear biased and
incomplete. For a sampling of views, the following list will suffice: ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
5. See Justice Hugo Black's dissent in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black,
J., dissenting), in which he argues that the reasonable doubt standard is not in the Consti-
tution. As Stephanos Bibas notes, the Sixth Amendment text says little about the charac-
ter of criminal trials. Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment
Originalism, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 45, 46 (2011).
6. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Coffin v. Unit-
ed States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
7. See, e.g., LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY (2006).
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guard against mistaken or malicious prosecutions precisely be-
cause it serves as a check on the actions of government officials.'
Its public and orderly character, its provision of opportunities for
defendants to confront and challenge the evidence produced by
state officials against them, and the right of defendants to have
the assistance of counsel during this process, were all conceived by
the nation's founders to be crucial in balancing the government's
formidable powers to arrest, charge, and convict. Only charge ad-
judication processes of this kind attain the legitimacy to which
exercises of government power should aspire.
Admittedly, some provisions of the Bill of Rights, especially as
they have been interpreted by the Supreme Court, are hugely con-
troversial. Fortunately, they can either be ignored for my purpos-
es or aspects of them that are not in dispute can be incorporated
into my argument. For instance, I can safely sidestep most of the
controversy concerning searches and seizures and the appropriate
remedies when state officials conduct improper ones.' Even if we
had very different rules governing searches and seizures, as well
we might, I doubt that they would lead us to abandon or signifi-
cantly modify other key constitutional provisions governing crimi-
nal procedure. With regard to the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, though some question the value or scope of the
right against self-incrimination, especially as it has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, I doubt that anyone thinks it consti-
tutionally permissible for state officials to torture or directly co-
erce (via threats) criminal suspects in order to gain confessions
from them.'o The unreliability of such confessions is too patent to
be tolerated, not to mention the ways in which such methods of
extracting information assault the dignity of persons. Hence that
8. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BIL
OF RIGHTS ch. 5 (1998); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL
BY JURY (1999); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994); Douglas A. Berman, Making the
Framers' Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO
ST. L.J. 887, 893 (2010); John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Dis-
appearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (1992).
9. Though concerns have been raised that prosecutors might use improperly obtained
evidence in plea negotiations. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bar-
gaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 82 (1968).
10. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936). For useful discussion of the right against self-incrimination, see the essays in R. H.




part of the provision might be folded into my argument without
too much difficulty.
It is worth noting that the nation's founders appear to have put
much more faith in juries than we do, permitting them to deter-
mine both facts and law, and thus to refuse to enforce laws which
they deemed to be unjust or unconstitutional.n Also, the right to
trial was not viewed as the defendant's alone to exercise or not.12
Jury trials were viewed as serving important public values, in en-
suring the integrity of charge adjudication procedures against
suspicions of corruption or tyranny, and in educating the public by
bringing them into contact with more learned judges and involv-
ing them in debates about public affairs. Most striking of all, giv-
en current practices, guilty pleas by those accused of crimes were
for a long time strongly discouraged, so significant were the per-
ceived purposes served by jury trials.1 ' Trials were esteemed as
adversarial contests in which defendants, aided by counsel, vigor-
ously challenged the government's case, rather than forums in
which defendants passively acceded to the government's accusa-
tions.
Times have changed, of course. It is not my aim to reject guilty
pleas or insist that all defendants be given jury trials. The crimi-
nal law is considerably more complicated than it was at the time
of the nation's founding and the volume of cases with which the
criminal justice system must contend is enormously greater. So
too the existence of standing police forces, armed with sophisticat-
ed technologies to detect and prove crimes, has likely increased
the number of cases in which there is overwhelming evidence of
defendant guilt. Trials might not be as necessary as they once
were to determine guilt, but many of the reasons why the founders
were so devoted to jury trials continue to have implications for
contemporary charge adjudication procedures.
It will be useful to press beyond the history of court decisions
and constitutional text affirming these constitutional values to
consider, if only briefly, what view about the state and its power
over its citizens organizes and makes sense of these values. Doing
so will help us to appreciate what anyone who wishes to reject
such values is up against. Two plausible accounts have emerged
concerning why the Constitution makes it so difficult for state offi-
11. AMAR, supra note 8, at 100; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 903.
12. AMAR, supra note 8, at 104.
13. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 922.
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cials to convict individuals of crimes. The first account emphasiz-
es the fallibility of our procedures for determining criminal guilt
or its absence. We know that such procedures sometimes produce
mistaken convictions and mistaken acquittals. As between these
two undesirable outcomes, we have a preference, and some would
stay a strong one, for avoiding the former kinds of mistakes more
than the latter kinds." By granting criminal defendants the pre-
sumption of innocence, insisting that the government bear the
burden of proof and meet a high standard in order to convince an
impartial tribunal, all the while shielding defendants from risks of
forced confessions, we express the societal preference for not pun-
ishing the innocent at the expense of punishing all of the guilty. If
mistakes cannot be avoided, it is better to err on the side of letting
the guilty go unpunished than to punish the innocent. 15
The second account is not at odds with the first account, but
suggests that there is more to these constitutional values than a
concern with error distribution." The second account begins by
noting the awful character of legal punishment, especially in its
more severe forms. Legal punishment authoritatively condemns
individuals, thereby stigmatizing them. It also deprives them of
goods (life, liberty, or property) to which they are otherwise enti-
tled. Moreover, its effects linger, with lengthy imprisonment hav-
ing the potential to sharply diminish the quality of peoples' lives."
At the same time, legal punishment's collateral consequences af-
fect others who are largely innocent of wrongdoing. In the face of
these sobering facts about legal punishment, it might be claimed
that we must strive for moral certainty, if not epistemic certainty,
in its infliction. The combination of the presumption of inno-
cence-understood robustly, as a presumption on the part of fact-
14. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). For a sophisticated defense of the view that trial procedures are set up
to distribute errors of different kinds, see also LAUDAN, supra note 7, at ch. 3.
15. I am not denying, of course, that considerable room for debate exists about both
how strong the preference for letting the guilty go unpunished to punishing the innocent
should be and how best to structure trial rules to achieve that degree of preference. For
further discussion of these issues, see Richard L. Lippke, Punishing the Guilty, Not Punish-
ing the Innocent, 7 J. MORAL PHIL. 462 (2010).
16. In developing this account, I draw on 3 ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL:
TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL ch. 3 (2007).
17. For an illuminating account of the psychological effects of imprisonment, see CRAIG
HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT
(2006). For an equally illuminating account of the effects of imprisonment on the economic




finders that those charged with crimes are factually innocent of
them-along with the burden of proof and the high standard of
proof is, according to this line of argument, a complex moral as-
surance procedure." Though we can never be epistemically cer-
tain that those we punish are factually guilty, we can set things
up so that it is difficult for the government to convict individuals
of crimes and punish them. Trials are ordeals for government offi-
cials, and should be. If we arrange things so that, in spite of the
odds set against them, government officials can convince fact-
finders of the guilt of defendants, then we will have acted reason-
ably and fairly in meting out legal punishment to those duly con-
victed of crimes.
I shall make no effort to privilege one of these accounts over the
other. Either will suffice for my purposes. The Supreme Court, in
some of its rulings, seems to favor the first, error distribution ac-
count." But the second account might have better resonated with
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. As
legal scholars have shown, eighteenth century criminal trials
emerged from earlier trials in which jurors had to be convinced to
render guilty verdicts in spite of their fears of adverse divine
judgment should they make mistakes.2 0 Judging others and
thereby being instrumental in the infliction on them of sometimes
spectacularly cruel criminal sanctions was viewed by inhabitants
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a morally freighted
task. The reasonable doubt standard may well have evolved not to
protect criminal defendants so much as to ensure fact-finders that
they would not be condemned by God for their mistaken verdicts,
if indeed such verdicts were the outcomes of trials. Though such
concerns might have ebbed by the time the Constitution and Bill
of Rights were adopted, the notion that considerable care (along
with a good dose of humility) must be exercised in rendering ver-
dicts in criminal trials likely persisted. Without this, it seems
hard to explain the disproportionate emphasis in the Bill of Rights
on the rights of criminal suspects and defendants.
18. So, too, the requirement of jury unanimity, or near-unanimity, promotes moral
assurance in the infliction of punishment.
19. Again, see Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (Har-
lan, J., concurring); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
20. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS
OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008); Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of
the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507 (1975).
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In any event, I hope it is apparent that the constitutional values
on which I draw in subsequent sections of this paper are solidly in
the mainstream of plausible thinking about the Constitution and
its history of interpretation.2 1 In a nutshell, these values point
unmistakably in the direction of having charge adjudication pro-
cedures that are public, orderly, and adversarial. Such procedures
should produce determinations of guilt or its absence by an inde-
pendent tribunal that is capable of putting its suspicions about
defendants aside and willing to convict only if the evidence pre-
sented to it is powerfully persuasive of the guilt of the accused.
We now turn to an examination of the ways in which contempo-
rary plea bargaining practices in the United States are at odds
with such values.
III. PLEA BARGAINING AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
The story I tell in this section is familiar, though some of the de-
tails are slightly different.2 2 Plea bargaining in the United States
has evolved in ways that give prosecutors vast and largely un-
checked power to pressure those they charge with crimes into en-
tering guilty pleas. The pressure exerted on defendants derives
primarily from prosecutorial manipulation (sometimes with the
tacit cooperation of judges) of the sentencing differential-the dif-
ference in punishment received by defendants who plead guilty
and defendants who go to trial and are convicted. Prosecutorial
ability to manipulate the sentencing differential depends on their
considerable charging discretion and their authority to make sen-
tencing recommendations.2 3 It is widely believed that prosecutors
routinely over-charge defendants in order to increase the pressure
21. It is worth noting that the presumption of innocence, along with the rights to be
promptly informed of criminal charges, to confront and challenge the evidence in support of
those charges, and to have all of this occur before an impartial tribunal that adheres to the
reasonable doubt standard have been incorporated into the law of the European Union.
For discussion of these provisions and their continued interpretation and refinement, see
ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 33-34 (4th ed. 2010), and
elsewhere in the text.
22. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, supra note 9; John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 58 PUB. INT. 43 (1980); Langbein, supra note 8; Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bar-
gaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
23. Though prosecutors' sentencing recommendations are not binding upon judges, the
evidence suggests that judges are loath to reject prosecutors' recommendations. See Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1394 (1970).
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on them to plead guilty.24 Since most jurisdictions in the United
States do not have concurrent sentencing schemes, the more
charges individuals face, the longer are their potential sentences.
Offers to drop charges in exchange for guilty pleas can thus open
up significant sentencing differentials. So can offers to make sen-
tencing recommendations significantly below the statutorily
available maximums. Depending on the kinds of crimes in ques-
tion, there is evidence that prosecutors routinely proffer sentence
reductions of from thirty-three percent to seventy-five percent be-
low the statutory maximums in order to attract guilty pleas.2 5
Needless to say, the combination of offers to drop charges and
make favorable sentencing recommendations can make guilty
pleas extremely enticing.
But that is not the end of the story, for it seems clear that de-
fendants who refuse plea bargains and are instead convicted at
trials risk post-trial sentencing recommendations by prosecutors
that are designed, in part, to punish them for having exercised
their constitutional right to trial adjudication. Though they are
hard to detect, let alone prove, so-called "trial penalties" appear to
be more than theoretical possibilities. Prosecutors do not appreci-
ate defendants who reject plea deals and force them to do their
jobs.26 Neither, apparently, do some judges.27
The distinction between the rewards defendants might receive
for waiving their constitutional right to trial, and with it the right
against self-incrimination and to appeals of their convictions, and
the extra measure of punishment they might receive for exercising
such rights, is crucial, though often glossed over in analyses of
plea bargaining.2 8 Simply put, there is a clear difference between
offering to reduce a defendant's punishment in exchange for a
guilty plea and increasing it (or threatening to do so) if she de-
clines the offer, goes to trial, and is convicted. The former might
plausibly be cast as offering defendants less than their deserved
24. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1144 (1976); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001).
25. See Schulhofer, supra note 22, at 1993; see also Josh Bowers, Punishing the Inno-
cent, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1117, 1143-45 (2007).
26. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
27. For discussion of the ways in which prosecutors and judges might seek to impose
extra punishment on defendants whom they believe are wasting everyone's time with
"needless trials," see MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS chs. 5-6 (1977).
28. I develop this distinction in greater detail in RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF
PLEA BARGAINING ch. 1 (2011).
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punishment. Of course, it will do this only if two further condi-
tions are satisfied: first, defendants must not have been strategi-
cally over-charged in order to put additional pressure on them to
plead guilty. Second, the sentencing scheme in place must be both
ordinally and cardinally proportionate-that is, such that it can
plausibly be characterized as tending to assign offenders deserved
punishments.29 Assuming that both of these conditions are satis-
fied, which they often will not be, rewards for waiving crucial
rights reduce the punishment that defendants might lawfully be
assigned and probably cannot accurately be characterized as "co-
ercive.""
Trial penalties, by contrast, are added sanctions assigned to of-
fenders not for their crimes but to discourage or punish them for
the exercise of their constitutional rights. I have argued else-
where that such penalties cannot be justified and are, as a result,
illicit.3 ' Unlike offers to reduce charges or sentences, the threat of
such penalties cannot plausibly be held to make defendants better
off.32 The Supreme Court would likely condemn the use of threats
of bodily harm by the police to induce suspects held in custody to
incriminate themselves. Yet it tolerates threats of enhanced pun-
ishment when it is the right to trial that is at issue. Part of the
problem, I believe, is that we lack an institutional mechanism for
disentangling waiver rewards and trial penalties, and thus for
distinguishing the contributions they make to sentencing differen-
tials." Subsequently, I describe such a mechanism. Supposing
29. On ordinal versus cardinal proportionality, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND
SANCTIONS 18 (1993).
30. Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz's claim that "the choice to plead guilty is too
generous to the offender" makes sense against this backdrop. See Robert E. Scott & Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1920 (1992). Yet Scott
and Stuntz fail to distinguish rewards for pleading guilty, which might not be deserved,
from trial penalties, which are likewise not deserved.
31. LIPPKE, supra note 28, at ch. 2.
32. Oddly, the Court worried that the imposition of a longer sentence at a second trial
(after the earlier conviction of a defendant had been overturned on appeal) would be per-
ceived as "vindictive" by defendants and thus discourage appeals in North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). However, the Court refused to see the actions of the prosecu-
tor in Bordenkircher as similarly vindictive in appearance, a point sharply made by
Malvina Halberstam in Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of Criminal
Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining Process,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1982).
33. Also, the majority in Bordenkircher reasoned that the prosecutor in the case could
have initially charged Hayes as a habitual offender and warned Hayes that if he refused to
accept the initial plea offer, he would go back and do so. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 370-71 (1978). The Court seemed to commit the error of thinking that warning some-
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that we adopted it, or something like it, would plea bargaining
have more solid constitutional footing? In other words, is the only
problem with plea bargaining practices in the U.S. that they mask
threats by state officials to punish defendants who insist on exer-
cising their constitutional rights?
Far from it. We should also be concerned about the magnitude
of the sentencing differentials that prosecutors can create inde-
pendently of whether they can threaten, and with the cooperation
of the courts, impose, trial penalties. Prosecutors' abilities to over-
charge, to add and drop charges, and determine sentence reduc-
tions enable them to exert enormous pressure on defendants to
enter guilty pleas. Defendants who face the difference between
custodial and non-custodial sentences, or between lengthy custo-
dial sentences and relatively short ones, have powerful incentives
to decline to put the government's case against them to the test.
Crucially, the larger these sentencing differentials are permitted
to become, the less important will be the actual evidence state offi-
cials can produce concerning the guilt of the individuals whom
they have charged with crimes. 4 Defendants who face formidable
sentencing differentials might be advised by their attorneys that
the state's evidence against them is unlikely to convince a jury of
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But such defendants will
understandably be reluctant to risk trials, especially if convictions
will yield disastrous sentencing outcomes.
Here we reach the nub of the matter: current plea bargaining
practices in the U.S. make it all too easy for state officials to inflict
punishment on individuals regardless of the evidence they have
against them. The jury, which in the Founders' view was a critical
bulwark against government corruption or overreaching, is effec-
tively excised from charge adjudication by large sentencing differ-
entials. And though judges are supposed to verify in plea collo-
quies that a "factual basis" exists for any pleas entered, it does not
appear that they do so with any rigor.35 This then means that
prosecutors' assessments of probable guilt do the bulk of the work.
one that you will be vindictive if he does not act as you desire makes it all right to subse-
quently behave vindictively toward him.
34. The "fast-tracking" of guilty pleas, whereby defendants are encouraged to enter
pleas quickly in order to get maximum discounts, likewise dilutes the impact of the evi-
dence on their decisions. As Bibas, supra note 1, at 1132, points out, defendants are there-
by induced to plead before they know much about the evidence the government has against
them.
35. See Jenia I. Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212-23 (2006).
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Moreover, prosecutors need not actually go very far toward assur-
ing themselves that they have charged individuals correctly or
have sufficient evidence against them. They can instead rely on
their charging discretion and abilities to influence final sentencing
outcomes to do most of the work of bringing defendants to heel. It
is hard to believe that the architects of the Constitution would
have felt comfortable establishing a system that placed so much
power over the lives of citizens in the hands of government offi-
cials operating without much real oversight. Whether one be-
lieves that the proof structure of criminal trials is designed to ex-
press a strong societal preference for avoiding errors of mistaken
conviction at the expense of errors of mistaken acquittal, or is a
moral assurance device for the justified infliction of legal punish-
ment, plea procedures that are so indifferent to the strength of the
evidence are worrisome.
Some members of the Supreme Court comfort themselves with
the notion that defendants who are willing to plead guilty simply
must be, in fact, guilty.36 Why else would defendants be willing to
plead in the first place? But this facile assumption ignores the
complexity of the defendant pool. Some, perhaps a substantial
majority of the defendants willing to plead, are guilty more or less
as charged. Since we cannot expect or require perfection in charg-
ing from prosecutors, the fact that they might, at times, mischar-
acterize offenders' conduct in their charging decisions is some-
thing we just have to accept. Defendants' attorneys presumably
have some ability to work with prosecutors to refine charges so
that they more accurately reflect the crimes their clients are will-
ing to concede that they committed. However, other defendants
facing the pressure of the sentencing differential might plead
guilty though they have been strategically and significantly over-
charged by prosecutors eager to resolve cases. Plea bargaining in
such cases might produce excessive punishment, or significant
errors in convictions in the sense that the crimes of which individ-
uals are convicted bear scant resemblance to the crimes which
they actually committed. Other defendants who are cowed into
pleading might believe that they are innocent, either because they
believe that they did not cross the line between legal and illegal
conduct, or because they believe they have valid defenses to the
charges against them. Of course, some of these kinds of defend-
ants will be mistaken-they did cross the line or juries would have
36. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1126-27.
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found their defenses unconvincing. But some might have gained
acquittals or convictions on reduced charges if seeking them was
not so risky. Finally, some defendants-and nobody knows how
many-will actually be innocent of all of the charges against them.
Many of the innocent who accede to guilty pleas, as Josh Bowers
has convincingly shown, will be individuals with criminal rec-
ords." They will accept another mark on their records as the price
to pay for avoiding the process costs of trials or the significantly
worse sentences they might receive if they exercised their right to
trial and were convicted. A few, and one suspects that here the
numbers are small, will be innocents without criminal records.
They are the unfortunate victims of such things as misidentifica-
tion by witnesses or the police, or misapprehension of the nature
of their conduct by the authorities.
A properly designed and functioning plea adjudication system
would be sensitive to these differences among the defendants who
indicate a willingness to enter guilty pleas. It would not be set up
to discourage all of them from exercising their right to trial, which
is not to say, of course, that it would infallibly process all who
have legitimate claims to partial or full exoneration. More than
this, it is far from obvious that a plea bargaining system should be
set up to discourage the guilty-as-charged from going to trial.
Nothing in the wording of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, for in-
stance, suggests that the rights they describe apply only to indi-
viduals factually innocent of crimes. We might hope that those
guilty of crimes and against whom the state has amassed consid-
erable evidence will not put us through the costly ritual of crimi-
nal trials. But it is an altogether different matter to take steps to
sternly discourage exercise of such fundamental rights-and in
the case of imposed trial penalties, punish them for it in seeming
violation of due process of law, since no jurisdiction with which I
am familiar openly and explicitly makes the "superfluous exercise"
of a constitutional right a crime."
IV. BRINGING PLEA BARGAINING INTO LINE WITH THE
CONSTITUTION
Summarizing, the Constitution and the history of interpretation
of several of its key provisions set up elaborate and formidable
37. Bowers, supra note 25, at 1124-32.
38. I assume that having prior notice that an act constitutes a crime is at least a neces-
sary condition of due process.
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protections for individuals formally accused of crimes by govern-
ment officials. These protections bar government efforts to force
or coerce confessions. They also establish a presumption of inno-
cence for the accused before the members of an impartial tribunal.
The government then has the responsibility to produce persuasive
evidence of the accused's guilt in a public forum, and that evidence
must be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. Jury trials, as we
have seen, serve vital power-checking and legitimacy functions.
They force government officials to put their cards on the table,
allowing other citizens to see what proof they have against those
suspected of crimes. Plea bargaining substitutes for this elaborate
public ritual an occluded one in which government officials con-
vince individuals accused of crimes to admit their guilt based on
the creation of a plea versus trial outcome sentencing differential.
The nature of the evidence in cases resolved by guilty pleas and its
role in convincing defendants to plead is thus murky. No one oth-
er than police, prosecutors, and judges need be convinced by the
evidence that the government has against defendants, and judges
seem too often convinced because police and prosecutors are.
It is tempting to conclude from this that plea bargaining in any
form is unconstitutional. However, I am not convinced that such a
move is either practicable or necessarily compelled by the logic of
the relevant constitutional provisions. A more feasible (though,
admittedly, not much more likely) approach would be for the Su-
preme Court to indicate its deep unease with plea bargaining in
its current form and articulate a set of constitutional principles
according to which reform of the plea system must be made to con-
form. The Court could then give states and the federal govern-
ment a time-frame within which they must bring their plea prac-
tices into line with the relevant principles. What might these
principles look like, and what plea practices would they sanction?
The answer to the first question is implicit in much of the anal-
ysis so far. First and foremost, any acceptable non-trial charge
adjudication system must give prominence to the evidence that
the police and prosecutors have accumulated against those they
have charged with crimes. It will not work to say, simply, that a
plea system must be set up so that it is the evidence amassed
against defendants that does the primary work of convincing them
to admit their guilt, though this way of putting things is not too
wide of the mark. Those charged with crimes might admit their
guilt for all kinds of reasons that have little to do with the evi-
dence against them and there will often be little that we can do to
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discourage them from doing so. In the face of this variety of de-
fendants, the key principle governing the state and its evidentiary
responsibilities is more like this: non-trial adjudication procedures
must be designed and structured so that we have reasonable as-
surance that the evidence the state has against defendants is suf-
ficient, all by itself, to convince them to enter guilty pleas. If plea
procedures are set up in this way, then it will not matter that
some defendants choose to enter guilty pleas for their own rea-
sons, ones having little to do with the evidence. Manifestly, how-
ever, current plea procedures do not give us this reasonable as-
surance. Given the rules governing such procedures, we can never
be sure whether it is the evidence that convinces defendants to
enter guilty pleas or sizeable sentencing differentials that do most
of the work of convincing them.
Second, we must structure non-trial charge adjudication sys-
tems so that some agent or agents independent of prosecutors and
police, in a formal public setting, carefully scrutinize the evidence
against defendants and have the authority to call a halt to all fur-
ther legal proceedings on some or all of the charges. This, in ef-
fect, is the traditional role of the jury of one's peers." Regardless
of what government officials suspect or believe about individuals'
crimes, and in spite of the evidence they can produce concerning
those crimes, the jury can acquit defendants if it is not convinced
of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.40 The role of the jury is
not merely advisory in nature, nor should it be. If trials in which
juries play the decisive role in limiting the power of public officials
to mete out punishment do not occur, then some suitable substi-
tute for them must be found. Current forms of plea bargaining, as
we have seen, place too few constraints on the decisions of police
and especially prosecutors to assign legal punishment to individu-
als whom they suspect of crimes. Again, though judges in plea
colloquies are supposed to independently review the evidence in
support of charges, few observers believe that they do so.
Third, the plea system must offer reasonable assurance to the
public that criminal charges are being resolved appropriately and
reliably. Current forms of plea bargaining render charge adjudi-
39. See Justice Scalia's claim in Blakely v. Washington that jury trials are
"circuitbreakers" in the government's machinery ofjustice. 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
40. The Fifth Amendment ban on double jeopardy makes acquittals by juries effectively
final, even if such acquittals are in error or if more evidence subsequently emerges that
strongly suggests the guilt of defendants.
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cation largely opaque.4 ' Charges are filed, negotiations about
facts, charges, and possible sentences take place off the record,
and the outcomes, effectively fait accompli, are presented to judges
at plea colloquies for ratification. Judges presiding over plea col-
loquies might have crucial evidence bearing on the crimes commit-
ted, or the culpability of the agents who committed them, withheld
from them or shaped by mutual consent of the interested parties.4 2
The public, including the victims of the crimes in question, have
little ability to monitor this process or discern why it yielded the
outcomes that it did. Granted, criminal trials also involve some
shaping of the evidence by exclusionary or procedural rules. But
compared with plea bargaining, trials are much more transparent
charge adjudication procedures. Charges are laid out, evidence is
presented by the state, the defense has opportunities to confront
and rebut the evidence, and summations are heard. Afterwards,
juries deliberate and announce their verdicts. Members of the
public might scratch their heads over verdicts, but at least they
are in a position to know what the charges were, what the sup-
porting evidence was for them, and what the procedure was for
accepting or rejecting them as proof of defendants' guilt.4 3 In plea
bargaining, by contrast, little is fixed or publicly accessible-not
charges, facts, nor the real process (versus the "show" process of
the plea colloquy) that produced the final outcome.
Fourth, non-trial plea adjudication procedures must seek to de-
tect and eliminate trial penalties. Again, trial penalties are addi-
tional increments of punishment assigned post-trial, the purpose
of which is to punish defendants for exercising the right to trial.
In my view, we must distinguish such penalties from lost or fore-
gone waiver rewards. Suppose that a modest waiver reward
scheme is consistent with the three principles articulated above.
Individuals who opt to enter guilty pleas might be granted slight
reductions in their deserved sentences in recognition of their hav-
ing spared the public the expense of trials. Individuals who go to
trial and are convicted would not receive these rewards but would
receive their deserved sentences. They would not be made to suf-
41. Cf. Langbein, supra note 8, at 124.
42. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1142; Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated
Sentences in a World ofBargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293 (2005).
43. In fact, persuasive reasons exist for requiring jurors to give reasons for their ver-
dicts in criminal cases. See Richard L. Lippke, The Case for Reasoned Criminal Trial Ver-
dicts, 22 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISDICTION 313 (2009). Doing so would, among other things,
increase the transparency with which juries acted in reaching verdicts.
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fer further punishment over and above what their crimes merit.
Of course, this account presupposes that we have some way of de-
termining the sentence merited by each individual and thus the
means to distinguish lost waiver rewards and trial penalties. One
of the signal failings of the current system of plea bargaining is
that it makes no effort to distinguish the two, and thus permits
the courts (and some of plea bargaining's supporters) to lump the
two together and say that defendants who elect trial adjudication
risked longer sentences despite important differences in the bases
for those longer sentences.
What might a plea system that satisfies these four principles
look like? Various possible systems might do so. I will do no more
than sketch one of them. There is not the space, here, to defend it
against the alternatives that might be proposed." If we are to
have reasonable assurance that it is the evidence amassed against
them that is sufficient to convince defendants to plead guilty, then
it seems clear that we must adopt measures that strictly limit the
abilities of prosecutors (or other state officials) to manipulate the
sentencing differential. Setting aside trial penalties for the time
being, my view is that waiver rewards should be kept small-
something in the range of 10% reductions from deserved sentenc-
es. There is room for debate about whether such modest waiver
rewards should be fixed or capped, with room under the cap for
prosecutors and defense attorneys to negotiate.4 5 For the record, I
prefer fixed discounts in order to minimize the impact of the many
extraneous factors affecting sentencing outcomes when reductions
are negotiated.4 6 For now, it suffices to insist that waiver rewards
must be strictly limited. Doing so will considerably reduce the
abilities of prosecutors to attract guilty pleas if they cannot pro-
duce substantial evidence of defendants' guilt. Assuming the
elimination of trial penalties, modest waiver rewards will not offer
much sentencing lenity to defendants against whom the state's
evidence is weak. Such rewards will therefore be much less likely
to convince them to waive their right to trial and enter guilty
pleas. We will have set things up so that the evidence has to do
most of the work of convincing them, as it should.
44. For more elaborate defense of the position I adumbrate here, see LIPPKE, supra note
28.
45. For the view that rewards for pleading guilty should be capped, see Oren Gazal-
Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2295 (2006).
46. For discussion of these extraneous factors, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
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To the preceding, some will object that any proffer of a waiver
reward, no matter how modest or fixed, puts pressure on defend-
ants to waive their constitutional rights. If we want to devise a
scheme that fully values and honors those rights, it must be one
that offers those who admit their guilt nothing in exchange for
doing so. At the margins, so to speak, any waiver reward might be
sufficient to convince defendants against whom the evidence is
substantial, but not compelling beyond a reasonable doubt, to for-
go trials.
Though I am troubled by this objection, I do not find it quite
convincing. First, even a scheme offering defendants no waiver
reward might not eliminate all of the incentives, extraneous to the
evidence, defendants have to plead guilty. There are well-known
process costs of trials.4 7 These too might convince some defend-
ants, against whom the evidence is thin, to cave in and enter
guilty pleas--defendants who might have escaped convictions had
they pressed forward with trials. Granted, there might be little
we can do to fully eliminate or substantially reduce some of these
process costs. In this way they are unlike waiver rewards, which
we could entirely eliminate. Although process costs are different
in this respect, they are not different in putting some pressure on
defendants to admit their guilt and forego trials. Second, and
more to the point, so long as waiver rewards are kept small, I am
not persuaded that they would be significant enough to render the
evidence in a case moot. Substantial waiver rewards coupled with
trial penalties clearly tend to do so. Modest waiver rewards in the
absence of trial penalties seem unlikely to convince all but the
most timid innocents or partial innocents to enter guilty pleas.
The much more significant problem, in my view, concerns how
to discourage prosecutorial over-charging and its corollary, charge-
bargaining. Any scheme that aims to keep sentence discounts
modest in order to maintain the salience of the evidence in de-
fendants' incentive structures will be thwarted if prosecutors can
routinely over-charge and then offer defendants charge reductions
in exchange for guilty pleas.4 8 One type of over-charging, so-
called, charge-stacking, is facilitated by the lengthy and complex
criminal codes that have evolved in the United States. These
47. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).




codes contain redundant and overlapping offenses and sometimes
define crimes in ways that make it easier for prosecutors to con-
vict suspected offenders of something, even if not the crimes pros-
ecutors suspect that they have committed.4 9 It seems doubtful
that simplifying revisions of such conviction-facilitating criminal
codes will be undertaken voluntarily by state or federal legisla-
tors, or that the courts would be willing to demand such revisions.
Prosecutorial codes of ethics could be revised so that they emphat-
ically forbid strategic over-charging-that is, over-charging with a
view to putting pressure on individuals to plead guilty-and
charge bargaining. But the crafting and enforcement of such ethi-
cal provisions will prove difficult, especially since we would not
want them to discourage charge adjustments by prosecutors, un-
derstood as alterations in charges by prosecutors in response to
emerging evidence in cases.
One possibility would be to require prosecutors to keep records
of all charges initially filed and any subsequent changes made to
them and to provide brief, written rationales for the changes. But
who would examine this written record for signs of over-charging
or charge bargaining? This question brings us to the second part
of my proposal for reforming plea bargaining. Following the lead
of others, I have proposed that defendants willing to enter guilty
pleas should request hearings before a judge." Before such "set-
tlement hearings" occur, prosecutors would be required to submit
case dossiers in which all charges initially filed and subsequently
altered are detailed. Also, the case dossiers would provide sum-
maries of the evidence supporting any remaining charges. At the
settlement hearing, prosecutors would give brief presentations of
the evidence in support of the charges and defense attorneys
would have the opportunity to challenge that evidence. Settle-
ment hearing judges would also question defendants, who would
be expected to answer, since they have indicated a willingness to
admit their guilt." The point of such questioning would be to find
out not only whether defendants fully understand the implications
of guilty pleas but also, and more importantly, whether their
49. See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 518.
50. LIPPKE, supra note 28, at 16; see also Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1122; Note, Re-
structuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972).
51. To protect defendants who subsequently elect to go to trial instead of pleading
guilty, we could adopt a rule according to which any testimony offered by defendants at
settlement hearings would be excluded from trials.
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characterizations of their conduct match the charges to which they
are prepared to plead.
Crucially, such settlement hearings would not be understood as
serving to ratify plea agreements already in place between prose-
cutors and criminal defendants (or their attorneys). Such agree-
ments would be strictly prohibited, not only because they might
conceal illicit forms of fact, charge, and sentence bargaining, but
also because they would have been arrived at through confiden-
tial, and therefore non-public, negotiations. Instead, settlement
hearings would have two primary purposes. First, they would re-
quire judges, as agents independent of prosecutors, to evaluate the
evidence (including defendant testimony) and charges in cases, to
see whether or how well they match up. Judges would thereby
ensure that there is an adequate factual basis for the charges.52
Judges could be encouraged to drop redundant or overlapping
charges, as well as to ask questions about any dropped charges or
charges not filed by prosecutors. In that way they could attempt
to ferret out and discourage over-charging and charge bargain-
ing." They might also advise defendants that though there is
some evidence supporting the charges against them, it nonethe-
less is, in their opinion, well short of convincing beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. Hearing that from a judge might embolden some de-
fendants to reject guilty pleas and opt for trial adjudication-an
option I would leave open for defendants who have requested set-
tlement hearings.
Why believe that judges presiding over such hearings would
scrutinize the evidence in support of charges any more closely
than they appear to do during existing plea colloquies? The an-
swer is that such hearings would not be conducted in a context in
which judges were simply affirming agreements already worked
out between prosecutors and defendants' attorneys. Our current
plea bargaining system makes judges passive actors in the charge
adjudication process. When prosecutors and defense attorneys
reach plea agreements ahead of time, judges come onto the scene
52. I would concede that there is room for debate about the evidence sufficiency stand-
ard that should be employed by judges at settlement hearings. See LIPPKE, supra note 28,
at 19.
53. A more radical solution, one that is not without its own problems, would be to move
toward concurrent sentencing schemes according to which those who pled guilty to multiple
crimes would have to serve only the sentence associated with the most serious offense.




rather late in the process. It is understandable why judges might
then be reluctant to upset carefully worked-out settlements by
asking too many questions about the evidence. However, in a plea
system in which there would be no such prior negotiations, only
charges filed and evidence dossiers compiled, judges would be con-
fronted with different tasks. They would not be asked to ratify
agreements, but to serve as independent checks on the exercise of
the government's prosecutorial powers.
The active role of judges would be further strengthened by their
second crucial role during settlement hearings. Once they deter-
mined which, if any charges, were supported adequately by the
evidence, settlement hearing judges would be required to set pre-
sumptive sentences on those charges.5 4 Such presumptive sen-
tences would be the ones defendants could expect to receive if, in-
stead of pleading guilty, they went to trial and were ultimately
convicted of the charges." Post-trial alterations in presumptive
sentences would have to be justified in writing by the sentencing
judge and would be subject to appeal by both defendants and pros-
ecutors. Such presumptive sentences would make it difficult for
prosecutors or judges to impose trial penalties. Moreover, defend-
ants would know the worst outcomes they faced if they decided to
put the state's case to the test of trial adjudication. Defendants
who decided to go ahead with guilty pleas at the termination of
their settlement hearings would receive modest and fixed sentence
discounts on each charge." Also, once charges were upheld by a
settlement hearing judge and presumptive sentences announced
for them, I would prohibit prosecutors from dropping charges
without a further hearing at which the prosecutor would be ex-
pected to explain and justify the decision to do so. This would dis-
courage charge bargaining by prosecutors subsequent to settle-
ment hearings.
We might also consider giving the victims of crimes, or in their
absence, the general public, some direct role in settlement hear-
54. The sentences would be presumptive because trials might reveal defendants' crimi-
nal behavior to have been more or less serious than the evidence initially suggested.
55. In England and Wales, at so-called "plea and case management hearings," judges
set upper limits on the sentences that defendants will receive if convicted at trials. See
ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 21, at 303.
56. There are difficult issues that I shall have to elide concerning whether sentences for
defendants convicted of multiple crimes should be concurrent, consecutive, or something in-
between. For discussion, see Richard L. Lippke, Retributive Sentencing, Multiple Offend-
ers, and Bulk Discounts, in RETRIBuTIIsM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 212 (Mark D.
White ed., 2011).
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ings. The victims of alleged crimes could be invited to such hear-
ings and questioned by the presiding judge to see whether and to
what extent their accounts of what happened to them correspond
with the charges brought by prosecutors. This would discourage
illicit forms of fact and charge bargaining. Since many crimes lack
direct victims, we might appoint (or elect) individuals to serve as
public interest advocates at settlement hearings. Such advocates
could be provided full dossiers of the cases to be heard and given
opportunities to speak. Their presence would help ensure the in-
tegrity of the process, again by discouraging the shaping of facts
and charges by prosecutors and defense attorneys (and in some
cases, cooperative judges)." Settlement hearings would thus offer
the public greater assurance that criminal charges were being ad-
judicated in a reliable and accountable fashion.
V. OBJECTIONS AND REMAINING PROBLEMS
Various objections to the proposed reforms can be anticipated.
It will be claimed that that the plea regime I describe will be "inef-
ficient," in the sense that it will complicate and slow the charge
adjudication process and thereby increase its costs to prosecutors,
judges, and the public that ultimately foots the bill for their offic-
es. The Supreme Court has, at times, extolled the cost savings of
plea bargaining, though there is some debate about whether they
view those savings as a positive good in its own right or a saving
grace to what is otherwise a lamentable process." Though I do
not advocate the elimination of guilty pleas nor insist that all de-
fendants be given full-on jury or bench trials, I do not deny that
the settlement hearings that I propose would slow the plea process
somewhat. Also, frank judicial assessments of the evidence at set-
tlement hearings and limitations on waiver rewards might in-
crease the demand for jury trials. Though some Supreme Court
justices might regard this increased demand as an alarming pro-
spect, it is hard to see how such a view squares with the devotion
57. However, I would not permit crime victims a role in determining presumptive or
final sentences for defendants.
58. Pre-charge bargaining would also have to be strongly discouraged. This might be
most effectively done by requiring any correspondence between prosecutors and defendants
or their attorneys to be documented and then reviewed by judges at settlement hearings.
59. See Bapdy v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). But see Justice Scalia's re-
marks in Lafler v. Cooper, that though we have "plea bargaining a-plenty" it has, until the




of the Founders to jury trials. In particular, more jury trials
would educate the public about the criminal law and introduce
more popular sovereignty into the criminal justice system, both of
which are values that the Founders held dear. Further, it is hard
to take seriously any "resource savings" argument for the current
plea scheme in a society that arguably squanders huge sums on
the imprisonment of too many of its citizens for too lengthy peri-
ods of time. We could allocate more funds to the adjudication of
criminal charges without expanding our criminal justice outlays
simply by reducing our excessive reliance on imprisonment. Fi-
nally, though "efficiency" is an important value, it is hardly on a
par with the values of procedural and substantive justice, values
that are given much more than lip service in our constitutional
tradition.
It might also be objected that so long as judges can be convinced
to take more active roles in ensuring that there is an adequate
factual basis for guilty pleas, we need not limit the abilities of
prosecutors to manipulate the sentencing differential. If the con-
cern about contemporary forms of plea bargaining is that it makes
charge adjudication too insensitive to the evidence government
officials have against individuals, then the solution is simply to
make sure that the evidence is sufficiently probative. This could
be done by having judges closely scrutinize it; reducing prosecu-
tors' abilities to induce guilty pleas is not needed.
However, I am not convinced that the two parts of my proposal
can be so easily separated. First, if we permit prosecutors to ma-
nipulate sentencing differentials, it seems that we would have to
counter the pressure to plead that this creates by having judges
determine that the evidence meets a higher standard of proof-
something approaching the reasonable doubt standard. Other-
wise, there will be cases in which, though the evidence is "ade-
quate," it is far from convincing beyond a reasonable doubt and it
will be the sentencing differential that convinces defendants to
plead. Yet this is precisely the kind of situation that we were at-
tempting to avoid. The weaker evidentiary standard is defensible
only if sentencing differentials are kept small enough that they
exert little pressure on defendants to plead.
Second, suppose that the standard was not changed but that
prosecutors were allowed to manipulate sentencing differentials.
Suppose also that a judge determined that there was rt an ade-
quate factual basis for a plea in a given case. What then? Pre-
sumably the judge would decline to accept the defendant's guilty
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plea, thereby forcing the defendant to go to a trial at which the
defendant would, if convicted, receive the presumptive sentence
set by the judge. True, the defendant might not receive an inap-
propriate sentence for her crime, but she might receive one that is
considerably longer or otherwise more burdensome than the one
proffered by the prosecutor. This would create a situation in
which some, perhaps many, defendants would reluctantly go to
trial when they would much rather plead. It is not apparent why
we would want to create such a system, one that is a more or less
inevitable byproduct of permitting prosecutors to manipulate sen-
tencing differentials. It seems much better to have a system in
which we have good reason for believing that defendants who in-
sist on trial adjudication do so because they perceive the state's
case against them to be weak.
It might also be objected that what I propose does not go far
enough in certain respects. There are tools that prosecutors have
been provided, beyond manipulation of the sentencing differential,
that can be exploited to induce guilty pleas. For instance, exces-
sively harsh sentencing schemes will make those accused of
crimes desperate to avoid the worst sentencing outcomes to which
such schemes expose them.o Even modest sentence discounts
might be preferred to risking trials at which the full force of such
sentencing schemes will be felt-and this in spite of the flimsy
character of the evidence the state might be able to muster
against defendants. Likewise, the changes I propose will do noth-
ing about the kinds of "prosecution-friendly" provisions of the
criminal code that William Stuntz has shown facilitate convictions
for conduct that is only tangentially related to the real misconduct
of which individuals are suspected."' Assuming that such provi-
sions are over-inclusive in criminalizing conduct that the state has
no legitimate business regulating except for its serving as a proxy
for conduct that is appropriately criminalized, my proposal will
60. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2558 (2004).
61. Stuntz, supra note 24, at 531; see also STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 260-63 (2011). One of Stuntz's illustrative examples is the
"crime" of possessing burglar's tools. If prosecutors cannot prove that defendants committed
or attempted a burglary, they might nonetheless be able to prove that they possess the
equipment for doing so. Stuntz also argues that mens rea requirements have gradually
been elided from the criminal law, making it easier for prosecutors to prove offenses be-
cause they do not have to prove that defendants acted with criminal intent.
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not prevent or discourage prosecutors from charging individuals
pursuant to them. 62
It is possible to concede these two points but nonetheless stick
with my proposal. It should be apparent that even a properly de-
vised plea system can only do so much to limit unjust punishment
in a criminal justice system that over-criminalizes the conduct of
its citizens. Nonetheless, a plea system that considerably reduces
prosecutorial discretion, provides more judicial scrutiny of the evi-
dence, and makes the plea process more transparent accords with
important constitutional values. It cannot nor should not be ex-
pected to fix all of the problems with the criminal justice system.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The founding generation was wary of government power, having
directly experienced abuses of it during the Colonial period. The
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution thus conceived of the jury
trial as a critical bulwark against arbitrary or excessive exercises
of government power, though they did not spell out, in detail, how
such trials should be structured or conducted. Fortunately, suc-
ceeding generations have honored and extended their wisdom,
creating a proof structure for criminal trials designed to put the
government's accusations against its citizens to a formidable test.
Contemporary plea bargaining practices enable the government to
sidestep that test. They substitute charge adjudication by prose-
cutorial discretion for charge adjudication by public, independent
tribunals. The argument of this paper has been that we should
have little faith that existing plea practices honor key constitu-
tional values. But we need not abandon guilty pleas in order to
honor them, only restructure the conditions under which they are
obtained and entered.
dges might advise them that the state's case against them is weak.
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